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Alasdair Cochrane  
An Outline of Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice 
What are the political implications of animal sentience? Interestingly, most states are in 
agreement that because certain non-human animals possess sentienceÑthe capacity to ex-
perience the world and their place in itÑthey have a moral value of their own that must be 
taken into account by policy makers when formulating and implementing legislation. In-
deed, this is the basic rationale for animal welfare legislation across the world. And it is also 
a norm that increasing numbers of states are choosing to entrench in their constitutions. 
However, and as many animal advocates have pointed out, if this is the sole political impli-
cation of animal sentience, it doesnÕt do much for the lives and interests of animals them-
selves. For example, both animal welfare legislation and constitutional provisions have 
proved perfectly compatible with the horror and brutality of modern industrialized animal 
agriculture. As such, proponents of animal rights have argued that the political implications 
of animal sentience stretch much further than this conventional position. They have argued 
that the sentience of animals establishes a set of rights that does not just limit certain harm-
ful practices, but that rules many of them out. For example, animal rights do not just call for 
animalsÕ interests to be an important consideration when reforming animal agriculture; in-
stead, animal rights demand that industrialized animal agriculture be brought to an end. 
While I am in broad agreement with this animal rights position, and have defended it else-
where (Cochrane, 2012), in Sentientist Politics I argue that the political implications of ani-
mal sentience go still further. 
In order to explain, consider the case of human beings. It is of course widely accepted 
that humans have a moral value of their own that limits the harms that can be perpetrated 
against them, and a set of rights that demands that certain practices, like torture, slavery, 
murder and so on, are not visited upon them. All of this is clear enough from statesÕ criminal 
laws and constitutional provisions. And yet, human worth and human rights have even 
greater political significance than this. Indeed, it is widely held that the worth and rights of 
human beings shape the aims and structure of politics itself. For example, human rights are 
commonly thought to provide the justification for politics: we need an impartial political au-
thority to protect us in our rights, and to settle disputes when they are violated. They are 
also held to constrain the actions of a political authority: a state that routinely violates hu-
man rights, for example, loses its moral authority. Human rights are also widely thought to 
shape the decision-making of a political community, requiring that it be made in an open and 
democratic fashion. And the worth and rights of humans are also believed by many to set 
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the boundaries and membership of political communities, with rights to self-determination 
granting peoples the ability to determine their own fates. 
 But if sentient animals also have moral worth and rights, as I and many others be-
lieve, then it seems as if the worth and rights of all sentient creaturesÑand not just humansÑ
ought to shape the aims and structure of politics. In other words, it seems as though the 
sentience of animals does not just require us to limit or rule out certain harmful practices; 
instead, it requires us to transform the nature of politics itself. In Sentientist Politics, then, I 
argue that we have a moral duty to create and maintain political institutions dedicated to 
the interests of all sentient creatures. We have such a duty for at least three reasons. In the 
first place, we need political institutions in order to live up to our duties to respect the worth 
and rights of sentient creatures. Taking the interests of animals seriously places important 
and burdensome demands upon us. None of us individually could possibly live up to such 
demands on our own: for example, giving due consideration to the suffering of all other sen-
tient creatures is simply unmanageable. However, collectively we can create institutions 
whose purpose is to implement and mediate these duties on our behalf (Shue, 1988). Sec-
ond, political institutions dedicated to the interests of all sentient creatures are required in 
order that the basic rights of sentient creatures are properly secured. AnimalsÑjust like 
humansÑremain extremely vulnerable to harm without proper protection from a political 
authority. It is perfectly clear that the historical exclusion of animals from state protec-
tionÑjust like the historical exclusion of slaves, the propertyless, the working class, women, 
blacks, and so onÑhas been absolutely disastrous for them. It means that animals have been 
and are treated as mere resources and with impunity. An impartial political authority is thus 
vital if animalsÕ rights are to be robustly protected. And the final reason why we have a duty 
to create political institutions dedicated to the interests of sentient creatures comes down 
to determinacy. Put simply, the precise content of our duties to animals is not always clear. 
To take just one example, it is often unclear what exact obligations we have regarding those 
animals wishing to take up residence in our homes. And such conflicts of interest are com-
mon in many areas of human and animal relations. Because of uncertainty and reasonable 
disagreement with regards to our precise duties over such matters, we need an impartial 
authority to make a decision about the right course of action. Such decision-making pro-
vides clarity on the matter and provides assurance to all members of a community concern-
ing the behavior of others. 
 Of course, if we have a duty to create and maintain political institutions dedicated to 
the interests of all sentient creatures, we need to have some idea of what this new Òsen-
tientist politicsÓ ought to look like. What kinds of political transformations are we required 
to agitate for? The book does not offer a fine-grained institutional blueprint of these new 
POLITICS AND ANIMALS VOL. 5 (2019)
www.politicsandanimals.org 2
Copyright © 2019, Authors. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY 4.0 license.
!! ! !
political arrangements, in part because it seems that a good deal of institutional innovation 
and experimentation will be required in order to work out how to best protect the worth 
and rights of all sentient creatures. Having said that, it is also clear that some forms of insti-
tutions will serve sentient creatures better than others. The book argues that sentient crea-
tures are best protected by democratic institutions. Democratic institutions are required, 
the book argues, because showing respect to the interests of all sentient creatures entails 
having a political system with a close understanding of what those interests are. As such, 
there need to be mechanisms through which individuals can articulate their interests, have 
them discussed, and have them represented. Moreover, there also need to be mechanisms 
by which policy-makers can be challenged and held to account for their effectiveness in 
protecting the worth and rights of those over whom they rule. In other words, then, a sen-
tientist politics demands institutions that are participative, deliberative, and representa-
tive, as well as underpinned by a set of entrenched Òsentient rights.Ó However, the book also 
claims that these democratic institutions should contain dedicated animal representatives. 
This is because leaving the representation of animals to legislators who are also charged 
with representing humans is likely to lead to the neglect of animals, for three reasons: ani-
malsÕ historical exclusion from our political systems; their inability to participate directly in 
systems of policy-making; and the fact that we cannot make legislators directly accountable 
to them. As such, if animal interests are to be heard, considered, and weighed fairly in our 
political system, they must be represented by officials who are dedicated to identifying 
those interests and speaking on their behalf.  
Of course, representing the interests of animals in this way comes with considerable 
challenges. The book argues that, in order to be attentive to their complex interests, the 
animalsÕ representatives must be trained in the art of Ògood listeningÓ (Dobson, 2014), and 
be required to spend time, and communicate, with their constituents. The book further ar-
gues that these representatives ought to be selected in periodic elections, so that they can 
be held accountable. While the electorate charged with selecting these animal representa-
tives will inevitably be made up of humans, the book proposes that deliberative citizen as-
semblies may provide a useful means to overcome humansÕ self-interest when making such 
selections. Such fora would allow voters to hear from and question candidates, evaluate the 
evidence in relation to their performance, and discuss with others as to who will act as the 
best available trustee for animals.  
But which animals should these representatives be acting on behalf of? Kimberly 
Smith (2012) has also recently advocated for the representation of animals within our po-
litical systems. Interestingly, however, she limits that representation to domesticated ani-
mals. Domesticated animals, she claims, merit representation on the basis that they can be 
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members of our political communities. Wild animals, on the other hand, cannot be members 
because they do not (usually) exist within Òentangled relationshipsÓ of care and dependency 
with us. Sentientist Politics takes issue with this claim, however, and points to the profound 
ways in which humans affect the lives of wild animals, and wild animals affect humans. For 
example, wild animals are dependent on humans in myriad ways, from decisions we make 
regarding the development of wilderness, ÒharvestingÓ fish from the ocean, burning fossil 
fuels, intensive farming, and so on. And humans are dependent on wild animals in myriad 
ways, whether it be pollinating crops, aerating soil, controlling ÔpestsÕ, and much more. For 
these reasons, the book argues that we exist in entangled Òcommunities of fateÓ (Held, 
2004) with wild animals, meaning not only that they are legitimate members of our political 
communities, but also members whose interests ought to be represented and counted in our 
formulation of the public good. 
One important challenge to including wild animalsÕ interests in our formulation of 
the public good is the fact that many of those interests are different and in conflict. Indeed, 
can there be a public good for a community whose members predate on, kill, and eat each 
other? I argue that there can, and, to understand why, it helps to consider the role of repre-
sentatives in formulating the public good. To explain, the job of political representatives 
ought to be to ensure that the interests of their constituents are represented when formu-
lating policy in line with the public good. That does not mean that the raw preferences of 
members are counted and aggregated. Instead, it means Òlistening forÓ the various and dis-
parate interests at stake, weighing them impartially, before translating them into a policy 
decision. The public good of a community, then, is not that which satisfies all members; 
there will always be those who lose out given the different and conflicting interests of mem-
bers. And nor is it necessarily that which is in line with the preferences of a simple majority. 
Rather, the public good is that which is constructed from a fair and impartial process of de-
liberation that has attended carefully to the interests of all members (Benn, 1959, as cited 
in Mansbridge, 2013).  
But when we say that the public good should attend to the interests of all in the po-
litical community, the question is raised, which political community? What are these politi-
cal communities, how are their borders to be determined, and what powers ought they to 
have? We could just take the borders of existing states as given; furthermore, and continuing 
the statist approach, we could also grant states final authority over a full range of policy 
domains. The book argues, however, that taking this statist line would be problematic for 
at least three reasons. First, some of the threats to the interests and rights of sentient crea-
turesÑsuch as climate change and plastic waste, for exampleÑrequire international coor-
dinated action above the level of the state. Second, a statist order leaves sentient creatures 
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vulnerable to the policy decisions and actions of those outside of their community. And as 
we know, no community takes only actions that do not have some impact beyond its own 
borders. Finally, states have a tendency to show unjustified partiality to their own mem-
bers, neglecting the harms suffered by outsiders. This book thus defends a Òsentientist cos-
mopolitan democracyÓ comprised of overlapping local, national, regional, and global com-
munities. Crucially, the powers of each of these communities ought to be determined by 
who is likely to be affected by policy-making in that area. This means that some existing 
powers of states should be devolved up to international communities, and some should be 
devolved down to more local ones. This remodeling of political communities should close 
the gap between those who make policy decisions and those who are affected by them, thus 
enhancing the political systemÕs ability to respect the worth and rights of sentient creatures 
around the world. 
But within this political order, should all these political communities be comprised 
of humans and animals? Or is there a case, as Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) have 
argued, for granting groups of wild animals their own political communities? Indeed, Don-
aldson and Kymlicka argue that recognizing wild animals as having sovereignty over their 
territories is necessary on the basis that it allows them to flourish and be protected from 
destructive human expansion into their habitats. This book evaluates these claims and ulti-
mately denies them. In terms of flourishing, a norm of non-intervention actually leaves wild 
animals to suffer and die when we could protect them. And in terms of protection, human 
expansion could be restricted through a system of robust habitat rights that falls short of 
sovereignty. Indeed, the book argues that the best way of protecting the basic rights of wild 
animals is not through treating them as foreign and distant outsiders, but through recog-
nizing them as equal members of shared mixed humanÐanimal communities.  
Of course, a potential problem with regarding wild animals as equal members of our 
political communities is that it seems to lead to our having positive duties of assistance to 
wild animals. Given the levels of suffering and premature death that wild animals endure, 
such duties would be both incredibly extensive and demanding. For many, not only is such 
an idea radically counter-intuitive and burdensome, but also extremely dangerous, raising 
as it does the possibility of humansÕ complete domination of nature. In response, Sentientist 
Politics argues that we do in fact have positive duties of assistance to wild animals, but only 
when such assistance can reasonably be expected to be effective and proportionate. Cru-
cially, of course, putative attempts at assistance will often be ineffective and disproportion-
ate. For example, in present and foreseeable circumstances, any attempt to bring to an end 
the very real harms caused by predation are likely to cause more harm than benefits overall. 
Attempting to remove predators from ecosystems through translocation or sterilization 
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would, in most cases, lead to huge increases in the populations of the prey they feed on. This 
would have seriously deleterious effects on other animals in those areas, such as the scav-
enging animals who depend on the corpses of the prey for sustenance, and animals who 
compete with the prey for food and habitat. Of course, the fact that many interventions will 
be harmful overall does not mean that all of them would be. So where smaller interventions 
can be reasonably expected to improve the lives of wild animalsÑsay, for example, in eco-
systems that are less sensitive to change or that have already been massively altered by 
human activityÑwe ought to undertake them. After all, we no longer regard the suffering 
of distant humans to be Ònatural,Ó Òinevitable,Ó and Òof no concern to us.Ó It is my contention 
that we should not make similar judgements about the suffering of wild animals. Put simply, 
a political system dedicated to the interests of all sentient creatures should not be prepared 
to sit on its hands in the face of the very real harms endured by wild animals. 
 But what if political communities do want to sit on their hands? After all, it is per-
fectly clear that individual and group attitudes in relation to animals differ enormously. So 
how much difference should a sentientist political order tolerate? And what should it do 
when any individual or political community acts outside Òthe bounds of tolerationÓ? The 
book answers this question by arguing that Òsentient rightsÓÑlike the more familiar notion 
of human rightsÑare minimal norms of justice that set limits on pluralism. Political commu-
nities should not tolerate individuals who violate the basic rights of sentient creatures; and 
the global political order should not tolerate communities who violate the basic rights of 
sentient creatures. This does not mean that all political communities must have identical 
political institutions, policies, and norms. But it does mean that when a community refuses 
to uphold its obligations to the individuals over whom it rules, the Òresponsibility to protectÓ 
falls on the wider group of communities. What that duty to intervene amounts to in practi-
cal terms will of course depend on what would be effective and proportionate. However, 
what is clear is that within a sentientist cosmopolitan democracy, the routine violation of 
the rights of sentient creatures cannot be tolerated for the sake of pluralism and diversity. 
But how is this sentientist cosmopolitan democracy to be brought about and main-
tained? It is true that the nature of the proposals in this book are incredibly radical and am-
bitious. The purpose of this book is to sketch what a political system dedicated to the inter-
ests of all sentient creatures might look like. In other words, its focus is on what is just, ra-
ther than what we are able to achieve here and now. Nonetheless, while the book is utopian 
in spirit, it also aims to sketch a realistic utopia (Rawls, 2001)Ñthat is, a system that it is at 
least possible for us to create. After all, if the prescriptions offered were completely fanciful, 
it is hard to see how they could motivate us to make efforts to try to take steps in their di-
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rection. While the book does not offer a list of all the necessary prerequisites of a sen-
tientist political order, then, it does conclude by offering some reasons to believe that the 
proposals are possible. In so doing, it provides a sketch of some of the necessary (but not 
sufficient) means by which a sentientist politics might be created and maintained. In the 
first place, the book argues that it is vital that our sentientist political system is underpinned 
by a civil society with sentientist solidarity; that is, a citizenry with feelings of shared affilia-
tion with sentient non-human animals, as well as a commitment to the institutions designed 
for their protection. It also argues that such solidarity is achievable and points to previous 
schemes of Ònation buildingÓ to show how it might be supported. Indeed, solidarity can be 
cultivated in a number of ways. For example, arts funding is crucial so as to broaden our 
moral and political imaginations (Cooke, 2017). Working for institutional change is also vi-
tal, as our political structures are not just simple reflection of social attitudes, but them-
selves serve to shape those attitudes (Ulas, 2015). Indeed, one important institutional 
change to bolster sentientist solidarity is in the education systemÑand the book explores 
how a Òsentientist civic educationÓ could be created to inculcate shared feelings of affilia-
tion across the species barrier.  
The example of education reveals how part of our efforts to move towards a sen-
tientist political system can and should involve transforming many of our existing institu-
tions. But wonÕt some institutions need to be abolished, rather than transformed? Moreo-
ver, in order to do that, given the powerful interests involved, wonÕt we need to circumvent 
existing political channels and use radical direct action? The book argues that while mean-
ingful change can and does occur through existing channels, more radical forms of agitation 
can also sometimes be justified. However, in order to be justified, such means must be rea-
sonably expected to realise those reforms in a proportionate manner. And under present 
conditions, attempting to promote such changes through violent revolutionary struggle 
would be ineffective and wrongheaded. 
In sum, then, Sentientist Politics seeks to make the case that the sentience of animals 
has incredibly far-reaching implications: simply put, we need to transform our system of 
politics so that it is dedicated to the worth and rights of all sentient animals. Moreover, the 
book also aims to sketch out what such a political system might look like: a sentientist cos-
mopolitan democracy comprised of mixed humanÐanimal Òcommunities of fate.Ó In making 
these claims, the book also calls for political scholarship and political activism to take animal 
seriously. This involves a call to scholars of institutions, democracy, governance, political 
economy, and so on to incorporate animals into their enquiriesÑto view them as the sub-
jects of political power that they are, and the agents of political change that they might be. 
And it also involves a call to animal activists to take politics more seriously. A small part of 
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that involves moving beyond questions of individual lifestyle change to consider how the 
levers of existing governing structures might be used to more robustly protect animals. But 
more importantly, it also means devising strategies to transform our political system so that 
it respects the worth and rights of all sentient creatures, and realizes inter-species justice 
on a global scale. 
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Siobhan OÕSullivan  
Sentientist Politics, a Worthwhile Utopia 
It is no understatement to say that I have read everything Alasdair Cochrane has ever writ-
ten (on animals). Cochrane is prolific and clever, and does not shy away from big ideas. His 
latest contribution, Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice, is no excep-
tion. 
As is often the case with CochraneÕs work, he starts by looking to the human para-
digm for inspiration. For the purposes of his latest book, Cochranes opens the discussion by 
boldly asserting that the worth and rights of humans 
shape the aims and structure of politics itself. [They]Éprovide the justification for the 
exercise of political power; indeed, a state which systematically violates human 
rights loses its moral authority. Human worth and rights are also believed to frame 
the structure of our political institutions...The worth and rights of humans are also 
thought to set the goals of our political institutions...And human worth and rights are 
also understood to shape the boundaries and membership of our political communi-
ties. (2018, 3, emphasis in original) 
If political institutions and practice does this for humans, Cochrane wants to suggest that 
they should do likewise for non-human animals. CochraneÕs end game is a transformation 
of Òthe very nature of politics itself É so that it serves all sentient creaturesÓ (2018, p. 3). 
That is no small task. 
If non-human animals matter, as Cochrane believes they do, then the question is not 
merely how the existing state might be harnessed such that it takes the interests of non-
human animals seriously. The question is, if we are to take the interests of non-human ani-
mals seriously, how might we develop a political model that is informed by the gravitas of 
those interests? This is, of course, a complex intellectual agenda. In CochraneÕs mind, if a 
political value, approach, or principle is fit for purpose it demonstrably advances the well-
being of all sentient individuals. In this book, he aims to identify those values, and then de-
fend their inclusion. What follows is a 55,000 word reflection on what a pro-animal political 
model might look like, if we were to take the best of what we have, apply the best of what 
we might have, and then check that all the principles/models proposed serve the interests 
of non-human animals. 
In short, Cochrane argues in favor of a Òsentientist cosmopolitan democracyÓ (2018, p. 
3, emphasis in original). The sentientist aspect incorporates the interests of all those who 
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experience pleasure and pain. The cosmopolitan aspect avoids what Cochrane describes as 
a ÒÔdifferentiated rightsÕ approachÓ (2018, p. 5), meaning that the interest protection af-
forded individual non-humans is not linked to the manner in which that animal relates to (or 
serves) humans. Cosmopolitanism also allows CochraneÕs theorization to be global in na-
ture, moving beyond the nation-state and responding to the needs of all sentient life on 
planet Earth. Finally, democracy affords a level of transparency, accountability, and repre-
sentation that Cochrane believes will benefit non-human animals.  
The book is not a handy Òhow toÓ guide for animal advocates and it does not show us 
how to systematically move from the status quo to a political system of justice for animals. 
Cochrane is aware of this (arguable) limitation, and flags it at the start: ÒOf course, it can 
legitimately be asked whether this theory of Ôsentientist politicsÕÑor indeed any other the-
ory of justice incorporating animalsÑhas any realistic prospect of being enactedÓ (2018, p. 
9). As such, the book is perhaps unlikely to find a readership among animal advocates or 
those with limited interest in abstracted political or philosophical ideas. Nonetheless, Sen-
tientist Politics is sure to be an instant classic with Animal Studies scholars generally, and 
essential reading for so-called Òpolitical turnÓ scholars, among whom Cochrane is already a 
leading figure. CochraneÕs approach of sketching the ideal political model is deeply thought 
out, beautifully articulated, and carefully constructed in relation to the existing literature, 
yet it is also new, refreshing, innovative, and boundary breaking. 
Importantly, to my mind, the book also points to a maturing of the field. Not so long 
ago it was thrilling to think that any politically trained scholar might turn their attention to 
animal questions. With the publication of Sentientist Politics, we see so-called political turn 
scholars beginning the gradual process of specialization, with some focusing on political 
philosophy and others turning their attention to more applied, policy-driven puzzles. 
Cochrane has clearly nailed his colors to the mast. If this was not the case before, he has 
now established himself as one of the worldÕs leading political theorists working on justice, 
rights, and non-human animals. In the remainder of this brief article, I will defend 
CochraneÕs decision to be boldly utopian in his response to animal suffering. Then I will play 
DevilÕs advocate, questioning the utility of what Cochrane has offered readers on this oc-
casion.   
 In Sentientist Politics, Cochrane tells us that his objective is to Òoutline and reveal 
what justice demands, as opposed to what might be achievable here and nowÓ (2018, p. 10, 
emphasis in original). He also posits that there are two broad approaches to political schol-
arship. There are Òtheories which seek to immerse themselves in existing debates, facts, and 
constraints in order to promote incremental change, say by influencing some specific as-
pect of current policy-makingÓ and those that make Òan important and crucial place for 
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more utopian theories: theories which use philosophical reflection to search for the truth 
of the matter about how things ought to be ideallyÓ (2018, p. 10). Cochrane locates himself 
closer to the latter; ÒThe theory defended in this book certainly veers towards the more 
ideal and utopian end of the spectrumÓ (2018, p. 10), but he also claims that it is Òdeliber-
ately and unashamedly soÓ (2018, p. 11), yet that what he offers up is a ÒÔrealistic utopiaÕÓ 
(2018, p. 11). That is, the theorization is not fantastical or fundamentally impossible. As 
Cochrane himself has pointed out, it does not violate the laws of physics. If we decided we 
wanted to, we could in fact set about transforming our political institutions such that they 
eventually resemble what Cochrane outlines in his book. 
As such, Cochrane is inviting readers to join him in a thought experiment; what might 
the world look like if the lives of animals were taken seriously? If animals matter, perhaps 
even as much as humans, and we decided to respond to that moral significance by formu-
lating political institutions that take that moral status seriously, what might that mean? This 
is yet to be tried. We are yet to formulate a political society using political principles se-
lected explicitly because they serve the interests of animals. If we are ever given the oppor-
tunity to do so, Cochrane has started the process of identifying the principles that those 
with a pro-animal sentiment should select. At the very least, he offers up candidates for our 
consideration. Moreover, even if we never actually have the chance to hand-pick political 
principles from scratch, by understanding what approaches work best for non-human ani-
mals and why, at the very least, we are well placed to start asking the question of what po-
litical institution X means for non-human animals. Answering that question will always be 
useful. 
It would be easy to dismiss Sentientist Politics as fanciful. But on that point, we must 
check ourselves. Today we take for granted the notion that a legitimate role for the state is 
to intervene in human/non-human animal relations, for the animalsÕ sake. But in the early 
1800s, that idea was ridiculed, mocked, and derided. The worldÕs first contemporary animal 
welfare bill was brought before the British parliament in 1800. It was the Bill for Preventing 
the Practice of Bull-baiting and Bull-running. It did not become law. A further three attempts 
were made to create the worldÕs first modern animal welfare statute, before the successful 
passage of the Act to Prevent Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle, commonly known as 
MartinÕs Act, in 1822. Hansard tells us quite a bit about animal welfare debates in the early 
nineteenth century. Reports such as this attest to the sheer audacity of the ideas: 
When Alderman C. Smith suggested protection should be given to asses, there were 
such howls of laughter that The Times reporter could hear little of what was said. 
When the Chairman repeated this proposal, the laughter was intensified. Another 
member said Martin would be legislating for dogs next, which caused a further roar 
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of mirth, and a cry ÔAnd cats!Õ sent the house into convulsions. (cited in Turner, 1964, 
p. 127) 
 
Needless to say, those deriders were on the wrong side of history. We do of course legislate 
for dogs. Indeed, dogs are among the species of non-human animal most heavily subject to 
legislative intervention (OÕSullivan, 2011). 
It would be a logical fallacy to suggest that because that nineteenth century ridicule 
turned out to be misplaced, anyone who ridicules current thought about politics and ani-
mals is also necessarily in the wrong. Clearly one does not have to follow the other. But per-
haps history can serve as a warning in this case. The nineteenth century animal welfare par-
adigm began with bold thinking, became commonplace, and is now the subject of serious 
critique. Every country in the western world has animal welfare laws, yet the harm done to 
the welfare of animals is immense in scale, brutal in nature, and seemingly intractable with 
regards to social acceptability. Perhaps it is time to do something new. 
With Sentientist Politics, Cochrane not only encourages, but arguably enables read-
ers to shift their thinking away from a narrow nineteenth century animal welfare frame. By 
heading in such an avant-garde direction, Cochrane invites readers to expand their own 
thinking. His theorization sketches a new, futuristic, as-yet unexperienced political para-
digm. In ÔImagined Utopias: Animals Rights and the Moral ImaginationÕ, Steve Cooke argues 
that Òone of the reasons so few people accept that animals have rights, and indeed why so 
few are even prepared to entertain the possibility that they might, is down to failings and 
limits of the imaginationÓ (2017, p. e4). In the same article, Cooke claims that Òenlarged im-
agination makes moral progress more likelyÓ (p. e11). If Cooke is right in his analysis, we all 
owe Cochrane a debt of gratitude. None of us need be constrained by a lack of imagination 
anymore. Cochrane has done the imagining for us. Despite the embryonic nature of just po-
litical institutions for animals, with the publication of this book, we can no longer claim that 
we do not know what a globally just political regime might look like. We now have one very 
coherent suggestion available to us. But while CochraneÕs contribution is very much appre-
ciated, it is legitimate to ask whether it points us in the optimal direction.  
 In 2007, I argued that Òfrom a political perspective, animals face two problems: one 
will be referred to as the Ôexternal inconsistencyÕ and the other will be called the Ôinternal 
inconsistencyÕÓ (OÕSullivan, 2007, p. 5). I defined the external inconsistency as an incon-
sistency in the way we treat non-human animals compared to humans and the internal in-
consistency as an inconsistency in the way we treat non-human animals compared to other 
non-human animals. I reasoned that 
both are problematic for animals, but until now theorists working within the liberal 
tradition have focused their efforts on addressing the external inconsistency, while 
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addressing the internal inconsistency only as a side issue É however É the internal 
inconsistency should be the central concern of those engaged in the task of concep-
tualising animal protection issues. Arguably, the external inconsistency has the most 
significant impact on animal well-being. However, as attempts to challenge the ex-
ternal inconsistency have so far failed to sway the mainstream, addressing the prob-
lem of the internal inconsistency provides an opportunity to achieve positive change 
for animals in a manner which sits more comfortably with dominant attitudes. 
(OÕSullivan, 2007, p. 5)  
With the benefit of hindsight, I wonder if I was too risk averse. Perhaps the past decade of 
Òpolitical turn in animal ethicsÓ scholarship and activism, not to mention the growth in peo-
ple committing to a vegan diet (at least in the western world), attests to some peopleÕs will-
ingness to stare down the external inconsistency and therefore address the single biggest 
obstacle to improving the level and type of protection available to non-human animals. 
But my purpose in advocating an internal inconsistency approach to pro-animal po-
litical change was to find a way to link a strong theory of justice for animals to existing and 
already accepted political principles. The rationale for this is simple; it seems to me that ty-
ing the wellbeing of non-human animals to a distant future, that very few agree with theo-
retically, and that has never existed in practice (or in the case of Marxism, where it has been 
implemented, its applied form has resulted in large-scale harms, both against the human 
and non-human populations), seems ÒwrongÓ in some important sense. At best, it would 
seem ineffective. At worst, it would seem to be a serious disservice to the animals. If A can 
only occur following B, and we have no reason to believe that B will be forthcoming, then 
we must either abandon any hope for A, or we might look for other ways in which A may be 
brought into existence. In some cases, we may even decide that A-1 is acceptable, because 
A can only follow B and B is just so unlikely to eventuate. 
Of course, none of this is new; it is the reform-versus-revolution argument. Animal 
Studies scholars will know that much ink has already been spilt over this issue (for example, 
see Francione & Garner, 2010). 
For some, it may be that the establishment of B is an absolute precondition for A. I 
suspect this is the case for some Marxist theorists. For such scholars, often working under 
the rubric of Critical Animal Studies (CAS), capitalism is the absolute central cause of animal 
suffering. For those who hold such a view, a shift towards A is only possible once we have 
established B, because, to their mind, justice for animals is only possible once capitalism has 
been overturned. If they sincerely see capitalism as the root cause of animal suffering, they 
have little intellectual wriggle room.  
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But it is not clear that Cochrane is in that position. For Marxists, the end of capitalism 
comes first, then good things follow. For abolitionists (of the animal rights variety), the 
property status of non-human animals is repudiated, then good things follow. For 
Cochrane, the inclusion of cosmopolitanism among the suit of political values that will pro-
tect animals from harm is not absolutely essential. Rather, it is a logical inclusion based on an 
examination of what cosmopolitan theorists seek to achieve. As such, Cochrane is not be-
holden to cosmopolitanism; he selected it, and could have selected something else. To me, 
that raises a question: is it responsible, ideal, or wise to make cosmopolitanism a pre-condi-
tion for animal wellbeing? An estimated 150 billion animals are purposefully slaughtered 
globally each year (The Vegan Calculator, n.d.). Is it fair for those individuals to be made to 
wait for utopian futures, when practical solutions could ease their suffering in the here and 
now?  
There is little to no reason to see cosmopolitanism in our short-, mid-, or even long-
term political future. But of even greater concern, cosmopolitans donÕt even want Òus.Ó By 
this, I mean that theorists working within the cosmopolitan tradition have made it abun-
dantly clear that they do not care about non-human animals. The 2014 edition of The Cos-
mopolitanism Reader does not list the words ÒanimalÓ or Ònon-humanÓ in the index, and of 
the 26 chapter-length contributions, not a single one gives non-human animals so much as 
a passing thought. The inclusion of chapters by Martha C. Nussbaum and Will Kymlicka sug-
gests that the situation is not entirely despairing. At least two of the authors have thought 
about non-human animals in a political context (see Nussbaum, 2006; Donaldson & 
Kymlicka, 2011). But more than anything, this is human-centric pie in the sky. That prompts 
the following question: if cosmopolitans do prevail, do we have good reason to believe that 
they will bring non-humans along with them? After all, Òin its most basic form, cosmopoli-
tanism maintains that there are moral obligations owed to all human beings based solely on 
our humanity aloneÓ (Brown & Held 2014, p. 1). This human-centric, untested, utopian po-
litical framework takes as its starting point the very principles we are trying (for the sake of 
the animals) to leave behind. 
When I defined the internal inconsistency, I did so with an eye to the practical be-
cause Ò[t]he notion that the state may actively discriminate against some individuals is not 
a recognisable element of liberal thoughtÓ (OÕSullivan 2007, p. 11). Far from perfect, liber-
alism does have a couple of hundred years of track record that suggests that, while its com-
mitment to equitable treatment often falls seriously short in practice, it can nonetheless 
bend, respond, and reform to argument and political pressure that illuminates its failings. 
WomenÕs liberation, the vote for the non-property-owning poor, and the abolition of slav-
ery are all testament to that capacity. Change is frustratingly slow. But Ò[g]iven the liberal 
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commitment to equity,Ó there is reason to believe that political mobilisation may generate 
Òequity among animals and animals onlyÓ (OÕSullivan, 2007, p. 11). At this point, it is not 
clear that there is good reason to push for a cosmopolitan polity, and then, if that is ever 
achieved, once again start down the long road of trying to persuade proponents of yet an-
other human-centric political order that they should include non-human animals in their 
utopian endeavors. 
Of course, I may be wrong. Cosmopolitanism may be perfectly suited to strongly pro-
tecting the interests of non-human animals. But we have no way of knowing that now, and 
I suspect we are unlikely to be able to answer that question using empirical methods any 
time soon. Therefore, for now at least, I thank Cochrane for his intellectual insights and for 
providing us with another way to conceptualize justice for animals. But I am going to keep 
plugging away in the here and now. I believe that liberalism provides us with enough tools 
to challenge speciesism, and I will continue to work with those tools until such a time as I 
am confident that they will be replaced with a different set of instruments. But that time is 
not now. 
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Alasdair Cochrane 
Cosmopolitanism for Animals: Response to OÕSullivan 
Sentientist Politics is a contribution to the so-called Òpolitical turnÓ in animal ethics. Like 
other recent work in the area, it assumes that the worth and rights of animals cannot be 
robustly protected if left solely to individuals; instead, appropriate political structures, in-
stitutions, norms, and policies are vital for their protection. Several recent contributions 
(Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Smith, 2012; Valentini, 2014) have argued that a political 
order that takes animals seriously must pay due regard to our relations with animals. In 
other words, they argue that what a particular animal is owed depends not just on the ani-
malÕs interests, but also on whether the animal is wild or domesticated, whether the animal 
happens to live in human society or in the wilderness, whether the animal can cooperate 
with human projects, and so on. Sentientist Politics, on the other hand, offers a much more 
ÒcosmopolitanÓ account of inter-species justice. It claims that what a sentient creature is 
entitled to ultimately comes down to the individualÕs interests, as opposed to their rela-
tional position. So, while their relational position might affect an individualÕs interests in 
some circumstances, such relations should not provide a basis for carving up individuals 
into discrete groups, each of whom is owed ÒdifferentiatedÓ rights. Such a focus on relations, 
so the book argues, can lead to a dangerous and problematic neglect of ÒoutsidersÓ: that is, 
a neglect of those who are not close to us through no fault of their own, and yet who never-
theless have important interests in how their lives fare. Sentientist Politics, as a book offering 
a cosmopolitan theory, seeks to develop an account of a political system that places the in-
dividual and their interests at its center, not the groups in which they happen to exist. 
 Siobhan OÕSullivan criticizes the cosmopolitan approach in the book in two ways. 
First, she argues that cosmopolitanism is simply too utopian. She argues that Òtying the 
well-being of non-human animals to a distant future É seems ÔwrongÕ in some important 
sense.Ó And, for that reason, she prefers to work with Òexisting and already accepted polit-
ical principles,Ó such as the liberal value of equality (see OÕSullivan, 2011). Second, she ar-
gues that cosmopolitanism is not just flawed because it is utopian, but also because it is an-
thropocentric: ÒThis human-centric, untested, utopian political framework takes as its 
starting point the very principles we are trying (for the sake of the animals) to leave behind.Ó 
Put simply, cosmopolitanism is ill-suited to protecting animals because of the exalted status 
it gives to human beings. 
 While both of these critiques are understandable, I believe that they miss the mark. 
Let us start with the charge that the cosmopolitan theory advanced in the book is simply 
too utopian. I certainly have sympathy with where this argument is coming from. For those 
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of us concerned with the immense suffering that billions of animals are enduring around the 
world, a book outlining a series of Òabstracted political or philosophical ideasÓ may seem of 
little use, or perhaps even frivolous. Nevertheless, we obviously do need reflection on ideas 
and principles to tell us why such suffering is wrong, what we can do to meaningfully stop 
it, and how more benign humanÐanimal relations might be fostered. Indeed, one of the most 
important claims of the Òpolitical turnÓ is that proper protection of animals requires more 
than putting an end to individual ÒcrueltyÓ and implementing policies that are more Òhu-
maneÓ; for much of the suffering that animals endure is structural in nature and derived from 
the political and economic systems we have constructed around them. For this reason, we 
need to think about new structures and systems that can serve animals (and humans) bet-
ter. OÕSullivan, of course, accepts all this. However, she might argue that we ought to think 
about structures and systems that are derived from what is already accepted. My proposed 
cosmopolitan democratic order, then, is simply too far removed from the conventional.      
There are three reasons to be wary of this critique. First, and as I explain in the book, 
we ought to reject the idea that there is only one way of making normative claims concern-
ing our relations with animals. There are a number of valid ways of making such claimsÑjust 
as there are number of valid ways of doing political theory. There is an important place for 
theories that seek to immerse themselves in existing debates, facts, and constraints in or-
der to promote incremental change. There is also a crucial place for more utopian theories: 
theories that use philosophical reflection to search for the truth of the matter about how 
things ought to be ideally. And, of course, there is a vital place for theorizing that takes place 
between these two poles. Sentientist Politics is certainly at the more utopian end of this spec-
trum. But I think such theorizing is necessary for two reasons: so that we have a clear pic-
ture of where it is we want to head; and so that we can rank the different feasible alterna-
tives available to us here and now (Stemplowska, 2008; Swift, 2008). Moreover, Sentientist 
Politics is not solely devoted to abstract theorizing; indeed, a whole chapter is dedicated to 
thinking about how we might bring about and maintain this new political system.  
Secondly, there is also reason to question just how utopian cosmopolitan principles 
actually are. After all, and as I point out in the book, cosmopolitan ideals are widely ac-
cepted. The ideas that individuals are of ultimate moral worth and that enjoyment of oneÕs 
basic entitlements should not be impeded by where one happens to be born or live are nei-
ther fantastical nor particularly radical. Furthermore, we can also see the real-world insti-
tutionalization of such ideals in the form of international human rights law, international 
prohibitions on crimes against humanity, the emergence of the Òresponsibility to protect,Ó 
and so on. It is of course perfectly true that this institutionalization is partial and imperfect; 
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these developments are embryonic, controversial, and contested. But what political insti-
tutions and principles arenÕt? Indeed, and this is the third point, OÕSullivanÕs call to work 
with Òalready accepted political principlesÓ overlooks the contested nature of all political 
ideas. For example, in her own work OÕSullivan seeks to apply the liberal principle of equal-
ity to our treatment of animals. But what is this shared and accepted principle of equality? 
There are fierce debates amongst political theorists, liberal scholars, and indeed policymak-
ers about the meaning and value of equality. To take just one issue, by way of example, what 
is it that we are trying to equalize when we promote equalityÑopportunities, resources, 
happiness, respect, or something else (Arneson, 2013)? Such contestation reveals that we 
cannot just use and apply Òaccepted principles,Ó but instead have to make choices about the 
principles we endorse. And those choices should of course be justified by the best reasons 
available to us. In Sentientist Politics, I argue that we ought to choose to organize our political 
system along the lines of a cosmopolitan democracy. This is on the basis that a series of 
overlapping Òcommunities of fateÓ is best at aligning the exercise of power with those who 
feel its effects. A sentientist cosmopolitan democracy thus allows affected sentient individ-
uals to inform and shape the policies they will live by. 
The second problem that OÕSullivan has with cosmopolitanism is its anthropocen-
trism. How can a theory holding human persons (and only human persons) in such esteem 
be the basis for a political order which seeks to respect the worth and rights of all sentient 
creatures? OÕSullivan is certainly correct that the vast majority of existing cosmopolitan 
scholarship espouses human supremacism. Indeed, the lack of concern traditional cosmo-
politan writers have given to non-human animals is quite remarkable. But it is remarkable 
because of its inconsistency. As I argue in the book, at the heart of cosmopolitanism is a com-
mitment to impartiality (Barry, 2010). Cosmopolitans are steadfast in the belief that an in-
dividualÕs proper entitlements and life chances should not be affected by factors that are 
morally arbitrary, such as where one happens to have be born. For this reason, cosmopoli-
tans have argued for a global theory of justice that transcends the borders of states. And 
yet, in spite of these purported commitments to impartiality and global justice, most cos-
mopolitan thinking has in fact been staunchly partial and parochial, constructing their theo-
ries on the basis of a rather prominent morally arbitrary group-based distinction: species 
membership.  
My claim, then, is that a consistent form of cosmopolitanism, one which takes its com-
mitment to impartiality seriously, simply must incorporate non-human animals. Put di-
rectly, the call in Sentientist Politics is not to use existing cosmopolitan theories to further the 
interests of animals; instead, it is to explore, imagine, and justify a renewed cosmopolitan 
political system that has the interests of all sentient individuals at its heart. And I believe 
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that this endeavor makes perfect sense. After all, because of their shared commitment to 
impartiality, cosmopolitanism and theories of animal rights are natural bedfellows. Indeed, 
this can be seen from the writings of thinkers such as Tom Regan, James Rachels, Jeff 
McMahan, Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, and more. All these writers aim to work out our 
obligations by focusing on the sentient individual and their interests, and eschewing mor-
ally arbitrary contingencies such as nationality, race, sex, or species. In other words, the 
work of all these animal ethicists is cosmopolitan in natureÑand, in Singer and NussbaumÕs 
case, explicitly so. However, none of these ethicists has yet to develop what a political order 
grounded in those principles would look like. My hope is that the system sketched in Sen-
tientist Politics offers one such proposal for discussion and debate.
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Josh Milburn 
Sentientist Politics Gone Wild 
Alasdair CochraneÕs first two booksÑhis 2010 An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory 
and his 2012 Animal Rights Without LiberationÑare crucial works in the political turn in ani-
mal ethics. An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory was one of the first books linking 
animal ethics to political philosophy, while Animal Rights Without Liberation has become one 
of the literatureÕs cornerstone texts. 
 Sentientist Politics, CochraneÕs third book, thus has big shoes to fill. In my view, how-
ever, it more than fills them. It is tightly argued, provocative, innovative, engaging, andÑ
perhaps most importantlyÑcompelling. I implore all interested in animals and politics to 
read it. The book opens up a series of discussions that are no doubt going to take place in 
the pages of academic journals and at conferences for years to comeÑon animals and cos-
mopolitanism; on animals and representation; on animals and international intervention; 
and much more. In this piece, however, I want to talk about the contribution that Sentientist 
Politics makes to one of the thorniest issues in animal ethics: the question of the relationship 
between humans and wild animals, and, in particular, what (if anything) humans should be 
doing about the suffering and death of wild animals attributable to starvation, disease, ac-
cidents, andÑof courseÑeach other. Part of the reason that this is so tricky is that it seems 
to be a set of problems almost unique to animal ethics, so there are only limited resources 
in wider normative thought that can be drawn upon to answer these questions. 
 Traditionally, animal ethicists have endorsed what we might call a Òhands-offÓ ap-
proach to wild animals. Tom Regan, in his 1983 landmark book The Case for Animal Rights, 
says that we should simply Òlet them beÓ (2004, p. 361). While it was not until 2010, with 
the publication of Clare PalmerÕs Animal Ethics in Context, that we finally got a book-length 
defense of this Òlaissez-faire intuition,Ó it has undeniably shaped ethical appraisals of wild 
animals for decades. The prevalence of a (mostly) hands-off approach to wild animals has 
carried over from work in moral philosophy to work in the political turn in animal ethics, 
though the idea has been discussed relative to institutions, rather than individual moral du-
ties. So, for example, we see Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011, chap. 6) arguing that 
wild animals should be considered sovereign over their territory, and we see John Hadley 
(2015) arguing that animals should be considered owners of their territory. These are not 
completely non-interventionist stances, but they remain broadly so. 
 There has been resistance to these non-interventionist arguments in some quarters. 
A number of philosophers, perhaps most notably Oscar Horta (e.g., Horta, 2013; Horta, 
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2018), have argued that we should be taking the suffering of wild animals seriously as a 
moral problem, and doing what we can to alleviate it. Horta has had an influence on an array 
of academics who have developed a surprising and provocative literature on the im-
portance of intervening in nature to minimize sufferingÑbiting a bullet that some critics 
have thought unbitable. This has attracted some very notable converts: for example, Jeff 
McMahan, WhiteÕs Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, has now 
published multiple excellent pieces advocating the reduction (including eventual elimina-
tion) of predation among wild animals (McMahan, 2010; McMahan, 2015). However, it is 
my view that only one person, to date, has called for serious intervention on behalf of wild 
animals in political philosophy. This is Martha Nussbaum, in her 2006 monograph Frontiers 
of Justice. She offers the notoriousÑand deeply underdevelopedÑcall for Òthe gradual sup-
planting of the natural by the justÓ (2006, p. 400). 
Based on his comments against intervention in predation in Animal Rights Without 
Liberation (see Cochrane, 2012, pp. 91Ð5), we might have placed Cochrane firmly in the 
hands-off camp. In Sentientist Politics, however, he has arguably offered the interventionist 
political theory that those interested in reducing wild-animal suffering have, until now, 
completely lacked. 
Cochrane argues that wild animals are members of our society. We are in entangled 
relationships of care and dependence with huge numbers of them. And collectively, we are 
in a shared Òcommunity of fateÓ (2018, pp. 52Ð3). This membership of wild animals entitles 
them to political representation. Not only do they have rights that are side-constraints on 
our actionsÑrights not to be killed, rights not to be tortured, etc.Ñbut their interests should 
help frame the structure and goals of our political institutions. They are co-members of our 
community, and their good makes up a part of the public good, and their interests should be 
represented in state apparatuses. In this sense, wild animals are little different from domes-
tic animals in the theory presented in Sentientist Politics. This contrasts strongly with their 
treatment elsewhere in the political turn in animal ethicsÑespecially in Donaldson and 
KymlickaÕs framework, where domestic and wild animals have very different political 
rights. 
In chapter 5 of Sentientist Politics, Cochrane argues against Donaldson and 
KymlickaÕs case for animal sovereignty, and, in its place, endorses the cosmopolitan idea of 
free movement (2018, pp. 79Ð88). He does, though, nod towards HadleyÕs animal property 
rights by endorsing more localized territory rights for animals (2018, p. 86). It is in the sec-
ond half of chapter 5 that we start to see why I suggest that Sentience Politics offers a polit-
ical theory for supporters of intervention in nature. Cochrane argues that co-members of 
our communities, including wild animals, are owed positive duties of assistance. But the 
POLITICS AND ANIMALS VOL. 5 (2019)
www.politicsandanimals.org 21
Copyright © 2019, Authors. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY 4.0 license.
!! ! !
lives of wild animals are frequently terrible. On one reading, the lucky ones face a quick, 
violent death shortly after birth. The unlucky ones face a long life full of fear, disease, ex-
tremes of temperature, and starvation. If wild animals have positive rights to assistance, as 
Cochrane holds, it is not hard to see how we can construct arguments in favor of interfering 
with these natural processes. 
Cochrane holds that the positive rights of animals Òdo not require or permit imme-
diate massive interventions by humans into natureÓ (2018, p. 13). But notice the word im-
mediate. In Sentientist Politics, Cochrane is offering an ideal theory. And for ideal-theoretic 
political philosophy, the pertinent question is not what we should be doing immediately, but 
what we should be ultimately aiming for. Thus, Cochrane asks, echoing Nussbaum: should 
we replace the ÒnaturalÓ with the ÒjustÓ? HereÕs his answer: 
In my view, such a proposal is extremely hard to argue against, absent an unduly ro-
mantic vision of nature. For we no longer regard the suffering of distant humans as 
ÔinevitableÕ and ÔnaturalÕ. Instead, most of us believe that we have a duty to assist hu-
mans in overcoming the harms caused by predators, disease, famine, and other ca-
tastrophes. Indeed, the ways in which humans have Ômanaged natureÕ in order to 
overcome such hardships are rightly celebrated and enjoyed everywhere. My con-
tention is that justice demands that we start to explore how we might make similar 
efforts for the sake of all sentient creatures, including wild animals. (2018, pp. 96Ð7) 
What does this mean in practice? Or, to be more precise, what does an ideal theory of hu-
man/wild-animal relationships look like? This, I contend, is unclear from Sentientist Politics. 
CochraneÕs theorization of a sentientist cosmopolitan democracy remains incomplete 
without a clear answer to this question, and, more generally, answering this question is 
surely one of the tasks of an interventionist political theory. It is a task that has arguably 
not been taken up by interventionist moral philosophers, but perhaps that is not surprising: 
it is a task that they might legitimately leave to political theory. I predict that this is a con-
versation that is going to take place among animal ethicists, and I suggest that it is an im-
portant conversation. In dialogue with CochraneÕs work, I propose to now start that con-
versation by briefly outlining five possible approaches to conceiving of ideal relationships 
between humans and wild animals. 
 IÕll call the first the piecemeal approach. This would involve making small-scale inter-
ventions to limit animal death and suffering when this seems to be achievable without too 
much cost to our societies, and without too many negative impacts on wild animals. This 
seems to be the kind of approach that Cochrane is endorsing when he claims we should be 
making Òsome carefully managed interventionsÓ in nature (2018, p. 95). So, for example, 
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Cochrane alludes towards intervention in urban environments, limited control of predator 
populations, the elimination of predator reintroduction programs, and similar (2018, pp. 
95Ð6). Indeed, it is my view that the piecemeal approach matches the preferred strategy of 
many of the philosophers and activists presently concerned with the reduction of wild-ani-
mal suffering. However, my worry is that it does not seem to match with the explicitly ideal-
theoretic approach that Cochrane takes in Sentientist Politics. This piecemeal approach 
seems to be a suitable non-ideal approach. Perhaps it is a way to move towards absolute jus-
tice in our relationships with wild animals, or alleviate some of the injustice in the world to-
day. But it does not tell us what just relations with wild animals look like. 
 Perhaps these just relations will look more like the natural-zoo approach. Nature, on 
this view, could be replaced by something like a zoo. Predators are kept away from prey and 
fed on in vitro meat, prey animalsÕ numbers are controlled through contraception, and so 
forth. All of this seems to be consistent with CochraneÕs wider interest-based rights ap-
proach. The natural-zoo approach, I suspect, is generally taken to be so absurd as to be a 
reductio of certain key premises. It is something that critics could present, for example, to 
justify their rejection of the claim that animals have rights. Now, as Cochrane says in Sen-
tientist Politics, the fact that it sounds absurd to replace the natural with the just (or, maybe: 
that it sounds absurd to some of us) is not a particularly compelling argument against the 
idea (2018, p. 89). That said, I am sure he would be prepared to accept that it sounds ex-
tremely strange, and even (pro tanto) extremely undesirable: It would amount to the abso-
lute elimination of nature (or, at least, sentient animals in nature), and near-complete human 
control of animal diets and behavior. It would not be hard to come up with clear aesthetic, 
environmental, and even animal-rights arguments against this. Now, perhaps these objec-
tions would not hold up on CochraneÕs account, but there are other objections to the natu-
ral-zoo approach that seemingly would. One important worry is that the natural-zoo ap-
proach would be very, very costly, in terms of time, money, and energy. This is something 
that would have to be balanced against the supposed benefits that it could deliver. 
 There are other alternatives. Perhaps ideal justice would resemble what IÕm going to 
here call, in a play on tranhumanism, the transanimalist approach. Cochrane cites Kyle Jo-
hannsson (2017), who proposes that we modify the genes of wild animals so that predators 
eat plants, prey animals have only small numbers of young, all animals are resistant to dis-
ease, and so forth. Utopian ideas about the elimination of all suffering through Òtranshu-
manistÓ means have actually been around in animal ethics for decades, but have perhaps 
not had as much traction as they could. Now, this transanimalist approach does not quite 
result in the Òend of natureÓ of the natural-zoo approach, and nor would it necessarily be as 
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demanding as the natural-zoo approachÑgene drives, once started, can sustain them-
selves. It would perhaps also be consistent with CochraneÕs interest-based rights ap-
proachÑat least in the abstract. The problem is that it is not clear if this would provide all 
the help that wild animals would be entitled to on the approach set out in Sentientist Politics. 
Animals would still be extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, exposure, and so forth, 
meaning that transanimalism could not be the whole answer. And we might worry that mod-
ifying animalsÕ genomes like this might involve the infliction of a great deal of suffering, and 
may necessitate animal testingÑthings that Cochrane, and likely almost any animal ethicist, 
is very concerned about. So perhaps this is not a perfect solution, either. 
 Let me offer yet another possibility. Perhaps we should be talking about what I will 
call the extinctionist approach. The animal-rights theorist Gary FrancioneÑwho is a clear tar-
get of criticism in CochraneÕs Animal Rights Without LiberationÑis notorious for advocating 
for the extinction of domestic animals (Francione & Garner, 2010), but one can easily imag-
ine an extinctionist approach to wild animals if the reduction of wild-animal suffering is our 
goal. After all, one of the easiest ways to prevent a million baby fish from suffering is to pre-
vent those million baby fish from being born. It is undeniable that this would solve the prob-
lem of wild-animal suffering. But surely, we may want to say, it solves the problem at too 
high a price. Imagine if this was proposed in the human case: a particular demographic of 
humans is seriously disadvantaged, suffers a great deal, and generally faces an early death. 
Would we be justified in just making members of that group ÒÔextinct,Ó perhaps through a 
sterilization program? Of course not. But maybe that is too quick: according to Cochrane, 
humans have an interest in controlling their own life in a way that animals do not (Cochrane 
2012, passim)Ñand he is open to controlling wild populations through sterilization (2012, 
p. 177; 2018, pp. 95, 97). So maybe the extinctionist approach to wild animals, bizarre 
though it sounds, is not out of the question. 
 I think thereÕs a sense in which all three of these endgamesÑnatural-zoo, postani-
malist, and extinctionistÑsound like they are wrong. I have a final possible answer. This is 
the epistemic approach. This draws from a puzzle that we sometimes find in the literature on 
ideal and non-ideal theory. Perhaps we are so far from the ideal that we are just not in a 
position to know what it looks like. In this case, in particular, it could be that the ideal is so 
far removed from our current conceptions that it sounds ludicrous to our 2010s ears. If we 
take the epistemic approach, then perhaps we can forgive Cochrane for apparently not of-
fering an ideal theory of human/wild-animal relationships. Perhaps we are simply not in a 
position to know what the right answer looks likeÑor for the right answer to sound desira-
ble to us. On this picture, maybe the piecemeal approach is not only a non-ideal solution 
tied to some kind of unspecified ideal futureÑperhaps the piecemeal approach is the only 
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approach we can take to find what the ideal is. On this view, as we become more concerned 
with the plight of wild animals in our politics and our everyday lives, and as we become more 
knowledgeable about wild animals and how to alleviate their suffering, we will become 
more able to conceive of the ideal relationship between humans and wild animalsÑor at 
least more able to accept it, if the ideal does look like one of the approaches IÕve sketched 
above. 
 IÕve explored five approaches to thinking about human wild-animal relationships 
that may be compatible with CochraneÕs sentientist cosmopolitan democracy. I hope it is 
clear that my intention is not to criticize, but to try to puzzle through these things as a fel-
low-traveler, or at least a sympathetic critic. But I do hope that I have started (or contrib-
uted to) a conversation that, in the shadow of CochraneÕs work, we need to have. According 
to CochraneÕs arguments in Sentientist Politics, we need to take the interests of wild animals 
seriously in our politics, and this necessitates a much, much greater concern for their death 
and suffering than we currently find in practical politics, political theory, and evenÑper-
hapsÑanimal ethics. But what an ideal theory of our relationship with wild animals would 
look like remains, even within CochraneÕs framework, hazy. I hope that, in the next few 
years, we will see some serious consideration of this question, whether that means defend-
ing one of my five approaches in detail, or coming up with something entirely new.!
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Alasdair Cochrane 
The Place of Wild Animals in a Sentientist Politics: Response to Mil-
burn 
Sentientist Politics has two primary goals. First, it aims to justify the idea that our political 
norms, structures, and policies need to be reshaped so that they show proper respect to the 
equality and rights of all sentient creatures. And, second, it aims to sketch out what a polit-
ical system with that ambition might look like. The place of wild animals within such a polit-
ical order is contentious. It is clear that many wild animals are sentient creatures with im-
portant interests in how their lives fare. As such, I have claimed that this means they have 
an intrinsic moral worth equal to that of all other sentient creatures, and a set of basic rights 
that imposes duties on moral agents. One of those duties is to create and maintain political 
institutions dedicated to the worth and rights of all sentient creaturesÑin other words, in-
stitutions that would give wild animals their due. 
 Now, it might be possible to give wild animals their due while excluding them from 
our political communities. It may be the case that wild animals have no interest in co-mem-
bership with us, and do not merit representation in our democratic decision-making. This is 
certainly the position of some authors (Smith, 2012; Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011) who 
have considered the issue. The view I put forward in Sentientist Politics, however, is very dif-
ferent. I argue that the lives of humans and wild animalsÑand indeed domesticated ani-
malsÑare interwoven and dependent on each other in complex and important ways. Wild 
animals are profoundly affected by our policy making and action. Furthermore, political 
communities rely on the actions of wild animals for a whole host of important functions. As 
a result, it is only right to regard wild animals as members of what political theorists some-
times refer to as our Òshared schemes of social cooperationÓ (Berkey, 2017): our well-being 
and flourishing depend on each other in fundamental ways. For this reason, then, giving wild 
animals their due requires acknowledging that they are members of our communities, 
whose interests must be represented in formulations of the public good. Such acknowl-
edgement is what justice for wild animals demands. 
 Josh Milburn, in his response to my book, asks, quite reasonably in my view, what 
this means in practice. What would just relations between humans and wild animals amount 
to? I argue in the book that it means that we have duties to incorporate the interests of wild 
animals into our formulations of the public good, duties not to violate their basic rights, and 
positive duties of assistance when such actions can be shown to be effective and propor-
tionate. But Milburn, again quite reasonably, wants to know more. What do these duties 
entail in concrete terms? In particular, what would an ideal world where we fulfil our duties 
POLITICS AND ANIMALS VOL. 5 (2019)
www.politicsandanimals.org 26
Copyright © 2019, Authors. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY 4.0 license.
!! ! !
to alleviate the suffering and death of wild animals actually look like? Helpfully, Milburn 
paints five candidate pictures for us to consider. First, a piecemeal approach, where we make 
limited interventions into nature when we can be sure that they would be effective and pro-
portionate. Second, a natural-zoo approach where humans aim to alleviate suffering by tak-
ing complete control over animalsÕ diets, behavior, and health. Third, a transanimalist ap-
proach where we engineer animals so that they are resistant to disease, can survive on 
plant-based diets, and so on. Fourth, an extinctionist approach where animal suffering is 
eradicated through eliminating them. And finally, an epistemic approach where we accept 
the limits of our knowledge about what a fully just world between humans and wild animals 
amounts to, and adopt only piecemeal interventions as part of an effort to come to a more 
reliable understanding of our end goal.  
 As Milburn predicts, the pictures that are closest to my own are his epistemic and 
piecemeal approaches. And this should be of little surprise. After all, when it comes to ef-
forts to assist wild animals, I argue explicitly that institutions ought to be guided by a Òprin-
ciple of proportionalityÓ: in order for our interventions to be justified, we will need to weigh 
the various interests at stake, and have compelling reasons to believe that our actions will 
cause more overall benefit than harm. In other words, we must accept the limits of our 
knowledge when it comes to the effects of intervention. And it is true that history teaches 
us that interventions in nature usually have harmful effects that are hard to predict. But as 
I also say, this gives us reason to be cautious, rather than never to intervene at all. For to 
refuse to intervene in cases where the evidence unambiguously suggests that assistance 
will do good would be a terrible shirking of our responsibilities. 
 But epistemic limits do not only apply in the context of our positive duties to assist 
wild animals. They can also apply in other contexts: when we are working out how not to 
violate their rights, and how to incorporate their interests into the public good. Moreover, 
these epistemic limits do not just arise when thinking about what we owe to wild animals, 
but apply in relation to our obligations to all sentient creaturesÑincluding humans. For while 
it may sometimes be clear what the protection of rights entails in any particular situation, 
that is often not the case. In the book, I give the example of healthcare: while sentient crea-
tures might all plausibly be said to have the right to healthcare, there will be considerable 
and reasonable disagreement about how far that right ought to extend and what it requires 
in particular cases. In other words, it can be hard to know what rights entail in concrete 
terms; hard to paint a picture of what perfectly just relations would look like when all rights 
are protected as they should be. Furthermore, not all policymaking engages with questions 
of rights; and in these situations, policies must be constructed that are aligned with the pub-
lic good. And in that construction, institutions must show Ôequal considerationÕ to all of the 
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relevant interests at stake. Once again, it is rarely obvious what that directive entails in spe-
cific contexts; rarely clear what a perfectly just set of policies would look like. Because of such 
indeterminacyÑbecause of our epistemic limitationsÑI have emphasized in the book the 
need for representatives to construct how rights ought to be interpreted, how interests 
ought to be balanced, and what the public good amounts to.  
Put simply, then, it is impossible to offer a complete account of what an ideal theory 
of just humanÐwild animal relations looks like. Instead, proper respect for the rights and 
worth of all sentient creatures must in part be constructed: it will emerge from the open, 
informed, and impartial deliberation of representatives of all members of the political com-
munityÑincluding representatives of wild animals. This is not to say that Òanything goesÓ 
and policymakers can construct whatever they like; for, as I also argue in the book, commu-
nities must entrench a set of Òsentientist rightsÓ both to guide and hold policymakers to ac-
count. Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that our epistemic limits mean that a complete 
picture of ideal inter-species justice cannot be predetermined.  
 Of course, just because a full, detailed, and precise nature of what we owe to wild 
animals (or anyone else) cannot be predetermined, that does not mean that there is no role 
for political theorists in offering guidance on what we owe. Indeed, in my view political the-
orists can play a powerful role in this endeavor in two ways. Firstly, they can offer advice on 
those procedural and institutional schemes which are best able to provide an impartial ac-
count of the public good, and hence of our precise obligations. Secondly, theorists can offer 
their own arguments to policymakers as to how the public good ought to be constructed. In 
other words, they can act as Òdemocratic underlabourersÓ (Swift & White, 2008)Ñpropos-
ing to representatives what they think our obligations to wild animals amount to in con-
crete terms. Sentientist Politics offers more detail in relation to the first of these endeavors. 
MilburnÕs response to the book, on the other hand, offers an important contribution to the 
second. Indeed, the five candidate pictures of just humanÐwild animal relations he paints 
provides a very useful starting point for thinking about what extending justice to wild ani-
mals requires of us.
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